Restructuring the Yugoslav Economy Through Development of Entrepreneurship and the Role of the Financial System. by Vahčič, Aleš
• 
Slovene Studies 12/1 (1990) 67-73 
. , 
RESTRUCTURING THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY THROUGH 
DEVELOPMENT OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 
AND THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Ales VahCic and Tea Petrin 
1. Introduction 
In this paper* it is argued that the recent attempts made in many socialist countries to 
reform their economies through greater reliance on the market cannot be successful without 
the development of a mechanism for the entry of new firms; and that this, in tum, cannot 
be developed without massive investment in domestic entrepreneurship. To support this 
process, a full-scale reform of the financial system is necessary. 
2. The need for transition from bureaucratic to market coordination 
Over the past decade a number of leading socialist countries have started to introduce 
economic and political reforms which seem to be more serious and far-reaching than any 
undertaken in the past. The common denominator of these reforms is an open recognition, 
at the highest political levels, that without a much greater reliance on the market coordi-
nation of economic activities, as opposed to the existing bureaucratic coordination, future 
economic development will not be possible. Although many prominent socialist 
economists have, since the early beginnings of socialist states, advocated market coordi-
nation as a necessary condition of efficient socialism, it is only recently that this view has 
been widely accepted by the top policy-makers in socialist countries. 1 
This change in ideological position is mainly a consequence of the profound change in 
global economic conditions, where technological advances and shifts in demand patterns 
have led to a rapid shift from mass-produced standardized consumer products to high-qual-
ity diversified products for specialized market niches. This shift made it almost impossible 
for the socialist countries to follow technological progress and to compete on the world 
markets within the existing framework of bureaucratic economic coordination. If socialist 
countries wanted to maintain or even enhance their position in the world economy, they 
had to reconsider their economic organization. 
It is obvious that the introduction of market coordination in socialist countries can have 
a positive effect only insofar as the markets will be reasonably efficient, which means that 
they will have to be reasonably competitive. To achieve competitiveness it is necessary to 
develop a mechanism for the entry and exit of filIns, and to ensure that the number of firms 
competing in the market can become as large as possible. 
Empirically we can observe that, in market-oriented economies, the market structure is 
characterized by what can be called a normal-sized distribution of firms, which means that 
the size distribution consists of a healthy mixture of small, medium and large finns. Small 
and medium-sized firms are extremely important for the maintenance of a competitive 
structure, and can be regarded as a vital part of efficient market economies. 
If we look at the market structure and size distribution of firms in socialist countries, 
we find that small firms - particularly in the range of from 10 to 100 employees-are 
nearly non-existent. 2 This is a direct consequence of bureaucratic coordination, including 
the control over the allocation of investment funds. For years there has been practically 
no entry and exit of firms, and growth has been achieved mainly through the expansion 
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of existing firms. New firms, if created, are invariably of medium or large size. There is 
practically no reduction in size of existing firms, in spite of the existence of hidden 
unemployment in most large firms. Whereas in the past there were many instances of the 
growth of firms through vertical and horizontal integration, the disintegration of large firms 
was very rare. It follows that an industrial structure of this kind is incompatible with the 
operation of efficient markets, and therefore one of the most important aspects of the future 
development of market coordination in socialist countries will have to be radical changes 
in industrial structure, which will eventually lead to a size distribution of firms which will 
bear a much closer resemblance to the existing size distribution in market economies. The 
crucial question is how to bring about this change in the market structure. 
3. The development of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial management 
The transition from a highly-concentrated and inefficient market structure to a compet-
itive market structure in socialist countries may be achieved (a) by the entry of new firms, 
and (b) by the division of existing firms into smaller units that can compete on the market. 
For the entry of new firms, one needs entrepreneurs, and for the trimming down of 
existing firms one needs entrepreneurial management. 3 A massive entry of firms requires 
the generation of a large number of project ideas and a correspondingly large number of 
entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial groups to carry out the projects. For this purpose the 
socialist countries will have to stimulate entrepreneurial behavior which may bring about 
entrepreneurial growth. 4 
In socialist countries the entrepreneurial role has been limited to the state bureaucracy. 
The system of economic regulation in these countries has required and stimulated managers 
who were good at performing tasks set by the bureaucratic leadership. Traditionally such 
managers have tended to exhibit limited initiative, conforming and accommodating them-
selves to regulations, and attempting to utilize the system to the advantage of the enterprise. 
They have been preoccupied with building effective links upwards, with the official organs 
of economic guidance. All of this has restrained them from making entrepreneurial 
decisions and from adopting an entrepreneurial mode of behavior. The development 
process was therefore limited to those processes and aspects which were consistent with 
bureaucratic entrepreneurship, most of which were related to the establishment of large 
enterprises producing low-quality mass-produced products for the protected domestic 
markets. In this development process - with the exception of some farming concerns, some 
handicrafts, and some personal services-there was no room for small- and medium-size 
enterprises which would require a large number of autonomous entrepreneurs. 5 
In this paper we argue that the following chain of relationships is crucial for effective 
economic reform in socialist countries: increased efficiency - efficient markets - compe-
tition - competitive market structure - entry of new enterprises - entrepreneurship. 
It is necessary to distinguish between two types of entrepreneur, each of which may 
require a different kind of person, with different background and training. The first type 
of entrepreneur comprises people who can effectively develop new, and especially small-
scale, enterprises, and bring them to market success. The second type of entrepreneur 
comprises those who can effectively break up, trim down and restructure existing large-
scale enterprises and make them into viable economic units. The first type comprises 
entrepreneurs in the classic sense, those who realize their ideas through new ventures; the 
second type comprises managers who can handle large organizations, but who are also 
capable of developing entrepreneurial management within existing organizations. 
In socialist countries there is an enormous need for both types of entrepreneur, since the 
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development 'Of a competitive market structure actually implies the filling-up of the 
so-called socialist black holes - totally empty economic spaces found in all sectors of 
socialist economies which, in entrepreneurially efficient countries, are occupied by firms 
employing between 10 and 100 employees. 6 In socialist countries fiuns of this size can be 
brought into existence either by establishing new firms, or by breaking up existing ones. 
Although the central parts of a divided enterprise may remain quite large, many sub-
sidiaries, plants and establishments formerly belonging to the bigger firms would become 
independent enterprises, falling within the range of small- or medium-size firms. In order 
to increase the supply of entrepreneurs and to stimulate entrepreneurial management, 
socialist countries will have both to introduce macroeconomic measures which will induce 
managers to take and accept risks and responsibility, and to develop full institutional 
support for the development of entrepreneurship.7 It should be realized that in many 
market-oriented countries, both developed and developing ones, full-scale policies for the 
development of entrepreneurship are now in operation, and this approach' should be 
adopted by socialist countries as well. 
The most important part of the institutional structure which has to be developed in . 
support of what we may call "entrepreneurship-led reform" in socialist countries comprises 
the financial institutions which would be specifically developed for the efficient perfor-
mance of this task. In the remaining part of this paper, we discuss some ideas about the 
development in Yugoslavia of financial institutions of this kind. 
4. The "Socialist Black Hole" in Yugoslavia, and how it may be filled 
To illustrate the order of magnitude of the market structure disequilibrium in Yugoslavia 
we present a graph (FIGURE I) of the "Socialist black hole" for the Yugoslav manufactur-
ing sector. 
The "black hole" in this example is contructed by comparing the size distribution of 
manufacturing firms in a mature economy close to equilibrium, in this case the Swedish 
economy, with the size distribution of Yugoslavia. The total area under each curve 
represents 100% of the total manufacturing labor force. The size class limits are calculated 
in such a way that the Swedish manufacturing labor force is uniformly distributed in the 
size classes containing 10% of the manufacturing labor force each. The Yugoslav size 
distribution of firms is then plotted against the same scale. This presentation clearly shows 
an almost complete absence of small-scale enterprises in Yugoslavia. The only small 
enterprises are at the very low end of the distribution in the private sector. 
The long-term strategy of industrial development would then require as one of its key 
elements the "filling in" of this "socialist black hole," achieved by the division of large 
firms and the entry of small ones. This "filling in" will not only require the development 
of entrepreneurship, which in tum will require strong institutional support and an economic 
environment which will stimulate managers to take risks and assume responsibilities, but 
will also require the development of financial institutions that will support restructuring. 
Two aspects of the financial market should be addressed: the primary and the secondary 
market. The former deals with the financing of new enterprises from new savings; the latter 
deals with the restructuring of existing enterprises. The question is: What sort of financial 
system should be developed to deal with both of these tasks? 
S. Financial institutions for restructuring existing enterprises 
In Yugoslavia it has become clear that a piecemeal and gradual approach to system 
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reform yields no tangible results. There is therefore now a growing awareness that radical 
changes in the economic system and the economic structure must be carried out. This 
effectively means that one has to take a global view and ask the following question: What 
should be done with existing production organizations, both in physical as well as in 
organizational terms, if maximum economic value is to be extracted from them? To 
visualize the extent of the problem we should consider that in the Yugoslav production 
sector there are at present over 20,000 production units, employing over 5,500,000 people, 
and having assets whose replacement value is about $80 billion. From the financial point 
of view we can visualize these 20,000 units as 20,000 balance sheets, with corresponding 
assets and liabilities. The fundamental fact of the current distorted financial system is that 
for most of the enterprises the balance sheet data, on both liability and asset sides, have 
practically no economic meaning. Identical fixed assets have widely-differing book values, 
depending on the particular arrangement and date of the assets' acquisition; and the same 
is true of liabilities. Related to this is the fact that identical real assets will imply widely-dif-
fering flow obligations for different enterprises. In any serious reform of the financial 
system, therefore, the existing balance sheets could in fact be scrapped. 
The next step would be to evaluate the current book value of all assets of all firms and 
enter the equivalent amounts as equity on the liability side of the balance sheets. All equity 
should be transferred to caretaking institutions which would then be charged with the 
responsibility of managing the social capital and would be directly responsible to the 
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representative political bodies. This would in effect be equivalent to the resocialization of 
social productive assets, which at present are more or less de facto in the collective 
ownership of workers' collectives, subject to haphazard outside intervention from political 
authorities at various levels. We can say that at present the property rights on productive 
assets in Yugoslavia are not clearly defined, and that it is unclear which groups of people, 
agencies or institutions are actually responsible for their efficient use. The new balance 
sheet would represent the basis on which the negotiation between the enterprises (workers' 
associations) and the caretaking institutions would be carried out. The main issue in 
negotiations would be to determine the economic value of the assets which would be a 
labor-managed equivalent of the market value of a joint-stock company. The determination 
of this value is of course a non-trivial matter, and the key problem is how to motivate all 
economic agents who have information on the potential use of the assets to reveal their 
knowledge, and so contribute to the objective evaluation of the economic value of the 
assets in terms of their future income-earning power. Once the economic value has been 
assessed and the equity adjusted accordingly, the assets would be leased to the ~ollective 
at the lease price, calculated by applying the prevailing interest rate. The past performance 
of the enterprise could be used as a bench mark for the evaluation ofthe lease price. Initially. 
a simplified solution could be used, by simply charging to each enterprise as the lease price 
the amount obtained as the difference between the past period's revenue minus the sum 
of material cost, taxes and contributions, and imputed labor cost. 
After the leasing arrangement is made the firm would be allowed to operate freely on 
the market without any direct intervention, formal or informal, and would be allowed to 
distribute all the surpluses that accrue. The firms would finance working capital require-
ments through normal commercial bank arrangements, while long-term investment would 
be financed through bank credit, fixed or variable bond issue, or equity investments by the 
caretaking agency. It would be in the interests of workers and managers to maximize the 
residual income which would then reveal the economic potential of assets and provide a 
new bench mark for the new leasing agreement. Although the scheme is not fully effi-
cient-since there would be a tendency, at least initially, to determine lease prices that 
would be too low-it would have the advantage that it would be relatively simple to 
implement, and would have the dynamic tendency to improve the economic use of assets 
while at the same time equalizing workers' incomes. It should also be pointed out that not 
everything should be prescribed in advance, and that more detailed arrangements, which 
would more precisely define the roles of various decision makers (i.e. , workers, manage-
ment, and outside agencies), should be left to the participants to decide. The fundamental 
idea, however, should be preserved, namely, that the basic economic relationship is 
between the enterprise as a whole-including its management-and society represented by 
the caretaking agency, rather than between society and management alone. 
6. Financial institutions for the entry of new enterprises 
Due to the magnitude of the problems associated with the need in Yugoslavia for the 
massive creation of new enterprises, it can be argued that the general reforms of the 
financial system to ensure the independence and commercial behavior of the banks would 
not be sufficient to perform the task. A highly developed network of financial institutions 
dealing specifically with the entry of new firms would have to be created. These institutions 
can be conceived as blends of development banks and venture capital firms, adapted to the 
conditions of a self-managed economy. Institutions of this kind can be structured, to a great 
extent, following the model of the Caja Laboral Popular of Mondragon, particularly its 
entrepreneurial division. 8 
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It would be'important for institutions of this kind to have diversified sources of funds, 
in order to spread the risk of failure over a large number of depositors; and also that the 
network of investors would include relatively large, financially strong organizations. 
The main source of investment funds would come from the lease payments by existing 
enterprises to the caretaking institutions, and from banking sources, whose ultimate source 
would be savings made by the general population. 
The basic difference between financial institutions of this kind and the traditional 
financial intermediaries is that the former, to a much greater extent than the latter, would 
be involved in the preparation of the investment projects, including the training of the 
entrepreneurs, and later the supervision of the efficiency of investment. 
Some of the principles underlying the formation of these financial institutions would be 
the following: 
• It is necessary to finance a large number of projects simultaneously; high returns can only 
be ensured for a large group of enterprises, rather than for individual ones. 
• The average expected rate of return of the newly-created firms (calculated at opportunity 
cost of labor) should be much higher than the return on financial investment on world 
financial markets. 
• The financing of each project must be carried out in phases. After each phase it is 
necessary to make a decision about the continuation of the project. 
• For each project full costs, including all preparatory work, should be accounted for. 
• The cumulative costs of unsuccessful enterprises at the moment of project discontinua-
tion should be transferred back to the financial institution. 
• Each enterprise which eventually succeeds must, during its lifetime, cover all investment 
costs, including all the interest from all projects. 
• The entrepreneur-innovator of a successful enterprise must receive part of the extra 
income generated. 
• When the enterprise begins regular production, it is constituted as a regular self-manage-
ment enterprise with business autonomy. In many cases the entrepreneur is supported by 
a professional management team. 
• For the minimization of risk, it is important that the financial institution should be able 
to intervene in the enterprise, should it determine that the return will be lower than 
expected. For this purpose it is necessary to establish an intervention department which 
monitors the activities of new enterprises when the expected reuslts are not achieved. An 
intervention department would not interfere with the self-management rights of the enter-
prise, but would only be authorized to safeguard its investment. These organizations would 
be run according to market principles, and their costs would be included in the costs of 
financing which the newly-established firms would have to cover from their income. 
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POVZETEK 
PREGRAJANJE JUGOSLOV ANSKEGA GOSPODARSTV A 
S SREDSTVOM RAZVOJA PODJETNISTV A 
v 
IN VLOGA FINANCNEGA SISTEMA 
Clanek obravnava pomen razvoja podjetnisrva in jinancnih institucij za prehod iz dosedOl~jega 
birokratskega uravnavOl~ja v tri no uravnavanje gospodarsrva, kot nujen pogoj poveeanja 
ucinkovitosti jugoslovanskega gospodarsrva. V prvem delu avtorja navajara posledice dosedanjega 
birokratskega upravUanja gospodarske aktivnosti na gospodarski razvoj Jugoslavije tel' razloge za 
institucionaino pod POl'O razvoju podjetnisrva in podjetniskega vodenja, se posebej v druibenem 
sekto~ju gospodarsrva. Na koncu avtorja obravnavata razvoj jinancnih instituc!i, potrebnih za us-
pdno prestrukturiranje jugoslovanskega gospodarsrva z vstopom novih in prekstrukturiranjem obsto-
jeeih neucinkovitih pojetij. Avtorja razlikujeta primarni in sekudarni jinancni trg tel' temu ustrezno 
navajata moi ne jinancno-institucionalne rdirve . 
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